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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
William Kiepke contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
because its analysis of whether the dog sniff unlawfully prolonged the detention, and thus,
tainted all the evidence found thereafter, was inconsistent with Idaho Supreme Court and United
States Supreme Court precedent. The State does not challenge his analysis in this regard.
Rather, the State argues that the district court’s decision should be affirmed based on the
idea that, because the officers might have had probable cause to arrest Mr. Kiepke for driving
without a license, any ensuing search was justified as a search incident to arrest. The Idaho
Supreme Court recently rejected the same argument in State v. Lee, ___ Idaho ___, 402 P.3d
1095, 1102-06 (2017). This Court should reject the State’s argument for the same reasons the
Idaho Supreme Court rejected it in Lee: the searches actually conducted in Mr. Kiepke’s case
did not serve the historical rationales for the search-incident exception to the warrant
requirement and the totality of the circumstances known at the time do not show the officers
were actually going to arrest Mr. Kiepke before discovering the fruits of the otherwise-unlawful
searches of his car and person.
As such, this Court should reverse the order denying Mr. Kiepke’s motion to suppress
and remand this case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Kiepke’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Kiepke’s motion to suppress.

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Kiepke’s Motion To Suppress
The State does not contest Mr. Kiepke’s primary point – that the district court’s decision
that the dog sniff was justified because it only caused a de minimus delay was contrary to both
Idaho Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court precedent. (See generally Resp. Br.)
Rather, it argues the subsequent searches of Mr. Kiepke’s car and person were justified as
searches incident to his ultimate arrest. (See generally Resp. Br., pp.7-12.) By not contesting
Mr. Kiepke’s analysis in regard to the propriety of the dog sniff, the State has effectively
conceded the district court’s analysis on that point was erroneous.
The argument which the State makes instead does not save those otherwise-unlawful
searches because the Idaho Supreme Court recently rejected that same argument. See Lee, 402
P.3d at 1095. In Lee, the officer confirmed Mr. Lee had been driving without privileges. Id. at
1098-99. The officer then frisked Mr. Lee. Id. The frisk revealed a knife and several containers
in Mr. Lee’s pockets. Id. At that point, the officer handcuffed Mr. Lee and placed him in the
back of his patrol car, telling him he would be receiving a citation for driving without privileges.
Id. The officer immediately proceeded to search the containers, and based on the results of those
searches, arrested Mr. Lee for possession of a controlled substance and paraphernalia in addition
to driving without privileges. Id.
Mr. Lee argued the contents of the containers should be suppressed because the search of
those containers exceeded the limits of the protective-frisk exception to the warrant requirement.
Id. The State countered that, because the officer had probable cause to arrest Mr. Lee from the
moment he confirmed Mr. Lee’s license was not valid, the officer’s subsequent searches were
justified by the search-incident-to-arrest exception instead. Id. at 1102. The Idaho Supreme
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Court rejected the State’s argument, explaining: “Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 . . . (1980),
does not stand for the broad proposition that probable cause to arrest will always justify a search
incident as long as an arrest follows.” Lee, 402 P.3d at 1105 (internal quotation and alterations
omitted, ellipsis added). Thus, it held: “the search incident to arrest [exception] is not so
absolute that it extends to every traffic stop in which there is probable cause.” Id. at 1104 (citing
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998)). Rather, the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed, the proper
analysis focuses on what the officers actually did, not what they might have otherwise done. Id.
at 1105; accord State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 170 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho
908, 917 (Ct. App. 2006); cf. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015) (“The
reasonableness of a seizure, however, depends on what the police in fact do.”).1
To that point, the Lee Court noted the officer’s actual actions in that case were
problematic because they did not serve either of the two historical purposes behind the searchincident exception: preservation of evidence of the crime of arrest or ensuring officer safety.

1

Mr. Kiepke anticipated the State might focus its argument on this alternative justification, and
so, noted that would be an improper argument under Lichty, Bunting, and Rodriguez because it
would not be evaluating the actions the officers actually undertook. (See App. Br., p.11 n.3.)
He reinforced that argument by noting the rule discussed in State v. Barwick, 94 Idaho 139
(1989) – that, if an officer acts unlawfully, the existence of a potential alternative justification
does not necessarily cleanse the evidence found from the taint of the unlawful action. (App.
Br., p.11 n.3.) The State contends that Barwick is factually distinguishable from Mr. Kiepke’s
case, and therefore, asserts his whole argument is unsupported by authority, and so, should be
rejected under State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996). (Resp. Br., p.11.)
Besides the fact that the State ignores Mr. Kiepke’s argument based on Liechty, Bunting,
and Rodriguez, the State’s attempt to factually distinguish Barwick from this case does not mean
that Mr. Kiepke failed to provide argument or authority in support of his position to the contrary.
The fact that Barwick applied the rule at issue to a different factual scenario does not mean the
rule it used is not also applicable to Mr. Kiepke’s case. The search in this case occurred after the
encounter was unlawfully prolonged, and so, the existence of a possible alternative justification
should not necessarily expunge the taint caused by the actions in which the officers actually
engaged. Compare Barwick, 94 Idaho at 141-42. Therefore, the State’s procedural point is
mistaken, especially since the Supreme Court’s subsequently-issued decision in Lee reaffirms
Mr. Kiepke’s point in this regard. See Lee, 402 P.3d at 1104.
4

Lee, 402 P.3d at 1103-04; see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (establishing these
as the historical justifications for the search incident exception). Rather, all the evidence needed
in regard to the status of Mr. Lee’s license had been obtained prior to the search of the
containers, and officer safety had already been addressed by the officer frisking Mr. Lee for
weapons. Id. at 1104; see also State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 662 (2006) (explaining that an
officer must be able to point to some particular facts demonstrating a person is armed and
presently dangerous to justify a search to protect officer safety).
The officer’s actual actions in Mr. Kiepke’s case did not serve the historical rationales for
the search-incident exception for those same reasons. As the State concedes on appeal, all the
evidence needed in regard to the status of Mr. Kiepke’s driver’s license had been obtained prior
to the otherwise-unlawful searches. (See Resp. Br., p.7.) Additionally, the concerns for officer
safety had been addressed at that point, as the officer had already performed a frisk of
Mr. Kiepke’s person after he told them about his pocketknife. (See Exhibit 1.) As a result, this
Court should not untether the search-incident exception from its historical justifications so as to
extend it to the situation presented in this case. See Knowles, 525 U.S. at 118-19 (refusing to
extend the bright-line rule allowing searches incident to arrest from United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218 (1973), to a situation “where the concern for officer safety is not present to the
same extent and the concern for destruction or loss of evidence is not present at all”); Lee, 402
P.3d at 1104; State v. Pederson, 157 Idaho 790, 794 (Ct. App. 2014) (explaining that the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), was “a reminder that
all searches incident to arrest must be tethered to the Chimel justifications”).
The other reason this Court should not extend the search-incident exception to this sort of
situation is that the totality of the circumstances known at the time do not indicate an arrest was
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actually going to occur prior to the otherwise-unlawful searches. Compare Lee, 402 P.3d at
1104. To that point, the United States Supreme Court has noted that, in warrantless-search
situations “[w]hen the government’s interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, the
presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750
(1984) (making this point in the context of an exigent-circumstances entry into a home); accord
State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 496, 500 (Ct. App. 2007) (same).
The totality of the circumstances in such scenarios is an objective standard and “the only
relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his
situation.”

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (applying this rule while

determining whether a person was in custody for Miranda2 purposes). As such, an “after-thefact revelation” of the officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant to this analysis. State v. Lewis, 107
Idaho 616, 621 (1984) (applying this rule in the context of a warrantless search of a house);
accord Berkemer, 462 U.S. at 442 (“A policeman’s unarticulated plan has no bearing on the
question of whether a suspect is ‘in custody’ at a particular time; the only relevant inquiry is how
a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation.”); State v.
Massee, 132 Idaho 163, 165 (Ct. App. 1998) (in determining whether the suspect was in custody,
“This subjective intent of the probation officer is irrelevant, however, because it was not
communicated to Massee.”); cf. State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 418 (2015) (explaining that,
because of the risk of the “distorting effects of hindsight,” analysis of the reasonableness of trial
counsel’s actions should be conducted based on the evidence known at the time of trial counsel’s
decision).

2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Accordingly, the Lee Court explained the fact of whether or not the officer subsequently
writes a citation is irrelevant to the analysis of whether an arrest was already going to occur. See
Lee, 402 P.3d at 1104. Similarly, it explained the subjective intent of the officer is not relevant
to that analysis unless he communicates that intent to the person being detained. See id. at 1105
(“While the subjective intent of an officer is usually not relevant in Fourth Amendment analysis,
statements made by the officer of his intentions along with other objective facts are relevant in
the totality of the circumstances as to whether an arrest is to occur”). The same is true in
Mr. Keipke’s case.
In fact, the testimony to which the State points in support of its argument (Resp.
Br., pp.8-9) – that the officer had decided to arrest Mr. Kiepke in the moments before or while
initiating the traffic stop – is strikingly similar to the testimony which the United States Supreme
Court held irrelevant in Berkemer: that the officer “apparently decided as soon as respondent
stepped out of his car that respondent would be taken into custody and charged with a traffic
offense.” Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442. Just as in Berkemer, the officer here did not communicate
those intentions to Mr. Kiepke. (See generally Exhibit 1.) Therefore, his testimony about those
uncommunicated subjective intentions is similarly irrelevant to whether the totality of the
circumstances known at the time objectively show an arrest was already going to occur. See
Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442. For the same reasons, Mr. Kiepke’s status as a parolee is irrelevant
to whether an arrest was going to occur because the officer admitted he did not follow up with
Mr. Kiepke’s parole officer in that regard. (See Tr., p.24, L.16 - p.25, L.17 (also admitting that
parole status alone is not a basis to arrest in such circumstances).)
Rather, the totality of the circumstances known at the time shows the officer abandoning
the investigation of Mr. Kiepke’s driver’s license in order to conduct a dog sniff. (See Exhibit
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1.) At that point, the officer had not taken any action to restrict Mr. Kipeke’s actions in a way
which would suggest a formal arrest was going to occur. See State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 578
(2010) (identifying such factors as the short duration of the stop, the visibility of the stop, the
modest number of questions, and the fact that the person had not been told his detention would
be anything other than temporary as indicating the person’s freedom had not been restrained to
the degree associated with a formal arrest for purposes of Miranda); State v. Christensen, 159
Idaho 339, 343 (Ct. App. 2015) (identifying such factors as whether the person is handcuffed or
placed in a patrol car, or whether the officers used force or drew their weapons on the person as
suggesting a formal arrest was being effectuated). In the absence of such actions, a reasonable
person would not associate the situation with one where a formal arrest was going to occur. See
Christensen, 159 Idaho at 343 (concluding that, absent such facts, a person in such circumstances
was not “in custody” for Mirada purposes).
In Mr. Kiepke’s case, the stop had, to that point, only been three and one-half minutes
long, and only a modest number of questions related to the purpose of the traffic stop had been
asked during that time. (See Exhibit 1.) Though the stop occurred at night, it occurred in a welllit area outside a motel. (See Exhibit 1.) The officers did not draw their weapons or use force
against Mr. Kipeke. (See Exhibit 1.) At no point was Mr. Kiepke told his detention would be
anything other than temporary. (See Exhibit 1.)
Rather, the officer simply asked Mr. Kiepke to sit, unrestrained, on the bumper of the
patrol car after he had been frisked. (See Exhibit 1.) That is particularly noteworthy since, in
Lee, the officers actually handcuffed Mr. Lee and placed him in the back of a patrol car, and yet,
the Idaho Supreme Court still found that the totality of the circumstances did not indicate an
arrest was going to occur in those circumstances. Lee, 402 P.3d at 1099. Basically, none of the
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officer’s actions indicate any effort to control or restrict Mr. Kiepke’s actions in the ways
associated with a formal arrest. Compare James, 148 Idaho at 578; Christensen, 159 Idaho at
343. Therefore, the totality of the circumstances do not objectively indicate a formal arrest was
going to occur prior to the searches of Mr. Kiepke’s car and person. It was the fruits of that
otherwise-unlawful search which led to his arrest.
As a result, the State’s argument – that this search should be upheld as a search incident
to arrest – fails for the same reason that same argument was rejected in Lee. The otherwiseunlawful searches served neither of the historical rationales behind the search incident exception
to the warrant requirement, and the totality of the circumstances known at the time of that search
do not objectively show an arrest was even going to occur just because Mr. Kiepke had been
driving while his license was suspended. Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court’s
decision to deny the motion to suppress since the officer unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop to
conduct a dog sniff and the subsequent searches are not justified under the narrow searchincident exception to the warrant requirement.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Kiepke respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying his motion to
suppress and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 29th day of November, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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